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I.

INTRODUCTION

As a Commissioner of the Federal Communications Commission ("the Commission"), I face the
challenge of determining how best to regulateor, at times, not regulate-the continuously growing and evolving communications industry. Absent specific statutory mandates, I must ascertain
the best approach to maximize consumer welfare,
increase competition, promote diversity, and foster innovation-in other words, how best to further the public interest. What I have discovered-at the outset of my tenure and throughout
my years in industry and government-is that
when a licensee's self-interest generally coincides
with the public interest, government should be
particularly reluctant to intervene absent specific
evidence of "bad acts."' Private actors understand
their businesses better than regulators do and are
far better able to respond to market changes and
technological innovation than government can.
Below I discuss two groups of licensees that illustrate how this convergence of public and private
interests manifests itself in the policymaking process. These demonstrations of regulatory restraint provide important lessons in how to promote the people's interest by harnessing private
interests.
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Each policymaker assessing the proper role of
regulation agrees that increasing consumer welfare is desirable. Views often differ, however,
about whether the public is better served in a particular instance by government intervention.
Many scholars have recognized that "[i]t has
never been shown that, as a general matter, A can
do a better job of choosing for B than B can do
for himself, especially when A is a state agency or
official that has limited knowledge of B's life
plans.
... When it is not clear that B's interest
and the public interest conflict, it is particularly
important for government to show restraint. Government should not intervene merely due to speculation about possible harms or due to a perception that regulators know the most precise "right"
way to bring about consumer benefit. I believe
licensees-not the government-should identify
the steps regarding how to achieve their goals absent any specific congressional policy directives to
the contrary or evidence of "bad acts," such as imposition of negative externalities on third parties.
This is particularly true where it seems that licensees' interests can be most readily characterized as
coinciding with the public interest.
The public benefits by having faith in the markets and in licensees' willingness and desire to
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see Kathleen Q. Abernathy, My View from the Doorstep of FCC
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VA. L. REv. 519, 546 (1988).

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

[Vol. 11

provide services that are valuable to consumers.
Imposition of paternalistic regulation could needlessly diminish or eliminate such public benefits
based only on speculation about a licensee's potential for "bad acts." This regulatory intervention also tends to err on the side of detailed regulation, which merely addresses a short-term goal.
Conversely, the marketplace often achieves
longer-term public interest benefits through
paths that are not necessarily foreseeable at the
time of the government intervention. For example, when the wireless industry was in its nascence,
the Commission contemplated detailed rate regulation and coverage requirements as methods of
achieving the short-term public interest goals of
keeping costs down and providing a minimal service level. Yet by refraining from intervention, the
Commission placed its trust in the powers of the
marketplace and in licensees' desire to fulfill customer needs for lower prices and better coverage.
This allowed the Commission to achieve the
longer-term public interest goals of price and
coverage competition beyond any regulator's
dream in remarkably short order. Obviously there
may be instances where a licensee's self interest
does not coincide with the public interest (e.g.,
interference with competitors or other service
providers, and incumbent wireline providers' reluctance to open up their local loops to competitors), and in these cases, the Commission should
indeed intervene. However, the need to intervene in those instances should not serve as ajustification for intervention in all instances.
This article will discuss two situations in which I
have concluded that granting licensees flexibility
to advance their goals would be far more beneficial than imposing paternalistic regulation. In
these cases, the licensees' interests do not conflict,
but rather coincide, with the public interest.
Thus, advancing these licensees' self-interests
also promotes the public interest. The first section of this article looks at the the Commission's
recent decision allowing noncommercial educational broadcasters to use their excess digital television capacity for remunerative services. The second section explains the benefits associated with

the Commission's decision to give flexibility to
licensees in the 2500-2690 MHz band, which is
used by operators of Instructional Television
Fixed Service ("ITFS") and Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service ("MMDS").
Both decisions involve licensees that serve the
educational needs of society-public television
stations and ITFS providers. These instances provide particularly strong examples of the convergence between licensees' interests and the public
interest. Government often imposes strict and detailed standards on these publicly-spirited actors
in an attempt to save them from themselves, apparently believing that government knows how to
achieve their goals better than educational licensees that are dedicated to public service do. I contend that such short-term micromanaging can
harm society more than it helps society. If we begin with the assumption that these licensees' missions serve the public interest, then we should reject the notion that government is better positioned than the licensees to assess what is in their
interest and how best to deliver their services.
Nor is government able to act as timely and effectively as licensees in this regard. Accordingly, the
public will be best served if these licensees have
the flexibility to offer more innovative services,
and I trust that these licensees will act in their
self-interest and consequently advance the public
interest.

3 In the Fifth Report and Order, the Commission
awarded each NCE television station a digital channel allotment to facilitate the conversion to digital television. See In re
Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact upon the Existing Television Broadcast Service, Report and Order, 12 FCC
Rcd. 12809, 12816a, 12956, 12960-61 (1997) [hereinafter

Fifth Report and Order].
4
See In re Ancillary or Supplementary Use of Digital Television Capacity by Noncommercial Licensees, Report and Order, 16 FCC Rcd. 19,042, 19,042, para. 1 (2001) [hereinafter
NCE Order].

II.

USE OF DIGITAL TELEVISION
SPECTRUM BY NONCOMMERCIAL
EDUCATIONAL BROADCASTERS

Early in my tenure, I was confronted with a
number of questions about how Noncommercial
Educational ("NCE") licensees could use their
digital television spectrum. 3 First, should NCE
licensees be allowed to provide non-broadcast ancillary and supplementary services, including subscription services, on their excess digital capacity
on a remunerative basis? Second, should such stations be allowed to include advertising on such
services? 4 Public stations wanted to be able to develop a new source of revenue with their digital
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spectrum-revenue that could be used to further
their mandate to serve the educational needs of
their communities. Faced with the very substantial government-mandated costs of converting
their facilities to digital television, public broadcasters were seeking a means to fund the transition and the development of new digital television
program offerings. 5 Opponents, however, were
worried that allowing NCE licensees to provide
such commercial services-particularly advertising-would undermine the value of public television. 6 Concern was expressed that creeping commercialism would not increase a public station's
ability to produce valuable educational programming, but effectively would decrease both the
quantity and quality of available noncommercial
programming. 7 Thus, I was faced with the decision of how best to ensure that NCE television stations would be able to serve the public effectively
in the digital era.
A. Background
To better understand this debate, I first looked
at the statute and the current regulatory regime
to which NCE licensees are subject.8 The Commis-

sion's rules have long provided that NCE broadcast stations will be licensed "only to nonprofit educational organizations upon a showing that the
proposed stations will be used primarily to serve
the educational needs of the community; for the
advancement of educational programs; and to furnish a nonprofit and noncommercial television
broadcast service."9 Traditionally, public broadcasters have financed their operations through
private donations and government funding. Con5
See, e.g., id.; see also Comments of the Association of
America's Public Television Stations to In re Ancillary or Supplementary Use of Digital Television Capacity by Noncommercial Licensees, MM Dkt. No. 98-203 at 27-28 (rel. Feb.
16, 1999) [hereinafter AAPTS Comments].
6
See, e.g., Dinesh Kumar, FCC Decision to Allow PTV to Solicit Ads, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 28, 2002, at 7 [hereinafter Kumar

I].
7
Dinesh Kumar, PTV Guidelines Being Revisedfor Use of Excess Digital Spectrum, COMM. DAILY, December 28, 2001, at 3
[hereinafter Kumar II].
8 The first tenet of my regulatory philosophy is that Congress defines the FCC's priorities through statute. See Abernathy, supra note 1, at 201.
9 47 C.F.R. § 73.621(a) (2002) (emphasis added).
10 47 U.S.C. § 399b(b) (1), (c) (2000); see also NCE Order,

supra note 4, at 19,042, para. 7.
11

47 U.S.C. § 399b(b)(2) (2000) (emphasis added); see

gress amended the Communications Act in 1981
to give public broadcasters more flexibility to raise
money for their operations. Section 399b of the
Act permits public stations to "engage in the offering of services, facilities or products in exchange
for remuneration" as long as such uses do not interfere with the stations' provision of public telecommunications services.' 0 The statute, however,
does not allow public broadcast stations to make
their facilities available "for the broadcastingof any
advertisement."'
In the analog environment, public television
stations may offer ancillary and supplementary
services on a remunerative basis only on their excess capacity (i.e., in the vertical blanking interval
("VBI")). For example, National Datacast, Inc. is
a for-profit subsidiary of the Public Broadcasting
Service that provides non-broadcast data services
through a television station's VBI.12 Public television stations, however, are not allowed to include
commercials on their over-the-air video broadcast service.
With respect to the digital channel, Congress
granted all broadcasters the discretion to provide
ancillary and supplementary services. Section 336
of the Communications Act provides that if the
Commission issues additional licenses for advanced television services, it "shall adopt regulations that allow the holders of such licenses to offer such ancillary or supplementary services on
designated frequencies as may be consistent with
3
the public interest, convenience, and necessity."'
In particular, ancillary and supplementary services
cannot denigrate a station's basic broadcast service. 14 Neither Congress, nor the Commission in
its implementing rules, distinguished between
also NCE Order, supra note 4, at 19,042, para. 7. "Broadcasting" is defined in the Communications Act as "the dissemination of radio communications intended to be received by the
public, directly or by the intermediary of relay stations." 47
U.S.C. § 153(6) (2000). In 1986, the Commission determined that the term "broadcasting" as defined by the Communications Act "refers only to those signals which the
sender intends to be received by the indeterminate public."
In re Subscription Video, Report and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 1001,
1004, para. 24 (1987), affd sub nom. Nat 'l Ass'n for Better Broad.
v. FCC, 849 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Subscription Video]. Thus, to classify a service as broadcasting, "the
licensee's programming [must be] available to all members
of the public, without any special arrangements or equipment." Subscription Video, 2 FCC Rcd. at 1004, para. 27.
13

NCE Order, supra note 4, at 19,042, para. 14.
47 U.S.C. § 336(a)(2) (2000).

14

See 47 U.S.C. § 336(b) (2) (2000).
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commercial and noncommercial stations in this
regard.' 5 Moreover, the Commission left the decision to each individual broadcaster as to the appropriate mix of services to offer, provided that
DTV licensees distribute, at a minimum, one free
over-the-air video signal to their viewers and otherwise meet their public interest obligations.' 6
Thus, with the technological capabilities associated with operating in the digital realm, a television station can use its 6 MHz of spectrum to provide high definition television ("HDTV"), multiple channels of video programming and data services.
Congress also placed other limitations on the
ability of public television stations to take part in
commercial ventures. Because of their status as
tax-exempt entities, public stations must engage
primarily in activities that further the tax-exempt
purposes of their organizations.' 7 With respect to
commercial activities that are not related to the
tax-exempt purposes of the public television station, income generated from such activities will be
taxed. 8 If the remunerative services become disproportionately large in relation to the primary
mission of the public television station, the licensee could lose its tax-exempt status and consequently could lose its television license. 9 Furthermore, in order to receive funding from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, public television stations that are not subject to oversight by a
state legislature or other political body must establish a community advisory board that reviews the
services provided by the station and significant
policy decisions of the station. Such oversight
15

See 47 U.S.C. § 336(a)(2) (2000); see also 47 C.F.R.

§ 73.624(c) (2000).
16 As the Commission explained:
[O]ur decisions today . . . ensure that broadcasters

have more flexibility in their business. Broadcasters will
be able to experiment with innovative offerings and different service packages as they continue to provide at
least one free program service and meet their public-interest obligations. We choose to impose few restrictions
on broadcasters and to allow them to make decisions
that will further their ability to respond to the marketplace. We leave to broadcasters' business judgment such
decisions as whether to provide high definition television or, whether, initially, to simulcast the NTSC stream
on DTV, and what and how many ancillary and supplementary service to provide.
Fifth Report and Order, supra note 3, at 12,812, para. 7. Moreo-

ver, the Commission stated:
By permitting broadcasters to assemble packages of
services that consumers desire, we will promote the swift
acceptance of DTV and the penetration of DTV receiv-
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helps ensure that a public station is providing programming responsive to its community and in line
with its educational nonprofit noncommercial
20
mission.
B.

Providing Public Stations Flexibility to Use
Their Excess Digital Television Capacity for
Commercial Services Will Further the Public
Interest by Giving Such Licensees the
Resources to Develop Quality Digital
Noncommercial Programming

Congress has specifically permitted public stations to use their excess digital television capacity
for remunerative purposes provided that advertisements are not included with any material that
is broadcastby the stations. Moreover, I found no
reason for the Commission to place any further
limits on this authority. Giving NCE licensees
flexibility to raise money to support their noncommercial educational digital television programming serves the public interest by furthering
the viability of public television. Thus, I supported the decision to allow noncommercial stations to provide non-broadcast ancillary and supplementary services on their excess digital television capacity on a remunerative basis and to include advertising on such services.
1. Statute
First and foremost, Congress has explicitly permitted NCE stations to use their excess capacity
for non-broadcast commercial ancillary and supers and converters ....
Indeed, we believe that giving
broadcasters flexibility to offer whatever ancillary and
supplementary services they choose may help them attract consumers to the service, which will, in turn, hasten
the transition. In addition, the flexibility we authorized
should encourage entrepreneurship and innovation.
For example, it may encourage the development of compression technologies that could allow even more digital
capacity on a 6 MHz channel, paving the way for multiple high definition programs and more free programming that would otherwise be offered.

Id. at 12,822, para. 33.
17

See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (c) (1) (2002); see also

AAPTS Comments, supra note 5, at 28.
18 See 26 U.S.C. § 513(a) (2000); see also AAPTS Comments, supra note 5, at 28-29.
'9

See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c) (3)-i (c) (1) (2001); see also

AAPTS Comments, supra note 5, at 29.
20

See 47 U.S.C.

§ 396(k)(8)(A)-(B)

AAPTS Comments, supra note 5, at 29-30.

(2000); see also
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plementary services. Such use fully complies with
Sections 336 and 399b of the Communications
Act. When Congress allowed public stations to
provide ancillary and supplementary services on a
remunerative basis, digital television was not necessarily envisioned. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that the additional spectrum available through digital operations should be a basis
for additional restrictions. Moreover, when Congress allowed digital broadcasters to provide ancillary and supplementary services, it made no distinction between commercial and noncommercial
21
stations.
In addition, the plain language of the statute
prohibits only the broadcasting of advertisements.
Section 399b defines advertising as any "message
or other programming material which is broadcast
or otherwise transmitted in exchange for any remu22 Some have argued that the
neration ......
broad definition of advertising precludes the inclusion of commercials on any service provided by
noncommercial entities-whether it is "broadcast
or otherwise transmitted.

23

The prohibition in

the statute, however, restricts the "broadcastingof
any advertisement." 24 Thus, the statute not only
fails to restrict the use of commercials by public
television stations on any non-broadcast television service (e.g., subscription television) they
may offer, but indeed authorizes it.
Other Public Interest Considerations

2.

Imposing paternalistic regulation that unduly
limits NCE stations' use of their digital television
spectrum would not further the public interest.
Some have argued that increased commercialism
would undermine and endanger the viability, integrity and value of public television. 2 5 I share
these same goals, but I do not believe that government is in a better position than licensees themselves to determine what is in a public station's
own best interest and, consequently, the public interest.
Permitting public stations to obtain additional
commercial support would increase the quantity
and quality of available digital television programSee 47 U.S.C. § 336(a)(1)-(2), (b)(1) (2000).
47 U.S.C. § 399b(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
23
47 U.S.C. § 399b(a) (2000).
47 U.S.C. § 399b(b) (2) (2000) (emphasis added).
24
See generally Comments of UCC, et al. to In re Ancillary
25
or Supplementary Use of Digital Television Capacity by Non21

22

ming and help offset the costs associated with the
transition to digital facilities. Allowing flexibility
in the use of digital spectrum, moreover, will foster innovation in this new service. Fears that increased commercialism will harm public broadcasting are merely speculative and should be assuaged by the existing parameters that limit commercial use of digital television spectrum. The
mission of public television is to serve the educational needs of the community. Thus, the
self-interest of public television stations coincides
with the public interest. Imposing additional regulation in the name of preserving public television is not necessary in this case.
a. Increase in Quality and Quantity of
EducationalServices
Concern has been expressed that advertising-based services would supplant local and community programmers and independent documentary makers. 26 However, digital television will provide educational broadcasters with more opportunities to provide quality noncommercial educational services, not fewer. 27 The Commission, in
the NCE Order, required public stations to use a
substantial majority of their digital spectrum for
non-profit, noncommercial educational programming.2 8 As stated earlier, the Commission
has permitted digital television stations to use
their spectrum for HDTV, multiple channels of
television programming and data services. Thus,
with digital technology, a public station has the
ability to provide more channels of educational
programming that would be available for local
and community broadcasters, independent documentary makers and other noncommercial educational programmers. Public stations can only use
their "excess" capacity for remunerative purposes.
Thus, the amount of spectrum that can be devoted to commercial services is limited and the
amount of commercialism that is permitted would
be minimal.
Allowing public stations to provide
non-broadcast ancillary and supplementary services on their excess digital capacity on a commercommercial Licensees, MM Dkt. No. 98-203, 9-11 (1999)
[hereinafter Comments of UCC].
26
27

See Kumar 1, supra note 6, at 7.
See AAPTS Comments, supra note 5, at 23.

See NCE Order, supra note 4, at 19,042, para. 15; see also
28
47 C.F.R. § 73.621 (a) (2000).
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cial basis will give stations more options in providing innovative services in the digital era. It is unclear how the market will embrace digital services.
Broadcasters-both commercial and noncommercial-need the flexibility to respond to marketplace developments to offer a mix of services that
the public desires.2 9 Inability to have flexibility
with their digital bandwidth could inhibit innovation at the threshold of the development of this
new technology. Those that support additional
restrictions on a public station's use of its digital
spectrum have not necessarily considered the
long-term public interest implications of unduly
limiting the flexibility and options such licensees
may have. For example, a number of new entrants, like Dotcast, are seeking to aggregate digital bitstream from many broadcasters to create a
national, wireless high speed network to provide
data and video services to consumers. 31 Public
stations could be valuable participants in creating
that national footprint. There is no reason to impose artificial and unnecessary barriers that prevent such involvement by NCE stations and hinder consumers' ability to receive these and other
innovative services.
b.

31

Funding

Providing noncommercial stations with additional funds to support their programming is critical at a time when such stations must incur significant costs to transition their stations to digital and
to provide high definition or multiple streams of
programming with their digital spectrum. 32 By

contrast, placing heavy restrictions on NCE stations' ability to raise funds through creative and
innovative uses of their digital spectrum, far from
29

The FCC generally should be reluctant to intervene in

the marketplace when emerging technologies are concerned,
because government is a poor predictor of the direction of
industry and technology. It is not that government is ill-intentioned or lacks intellectual capacity; rather, it is extremely
difficult to predict the twists and turns of the marketplace. In
light of this fundamental difficulty, government humbly
should recognize its limits and exercise restraint based on
the dangers of exceeding those limits. For a more detailed
discussion of this principal, see Abernathy, supra note 1, at
200.
30 E.g., Digital Broadcasting, Dotcast Selects SkyStream to
Support New Wireless Broadband Network, 1-2, at http://www.

digitalbroadcasting.com/content/news/article.asp?DocD=
{2F441EE7-37D6-11D5-A770-00DOB7694F32}

(Apr. 24,

2001).
31

See Matt Stump, DatacastPlayers Say They're Here to Stay,

[Vol. 11

preserving public television, could be the cause of
its demise. A paternalistic approach could deprive stations of additional funds that are particularly needed to shoulder the additional costs of
providing a digital public television service.
Some have recognized the funding issues that
public television stations face, but argue that
allowing these stations to provide a limited
amount of commercial services could result in the
loss of needed funding from the federal government and the private sector. Indeed, they recognize that although stations might start out with
the best of intentions or the "noblest of
goals... they will continue to pursue [commercialism] aggressively to the detriment of other programming," as additional revenue streams be33
come an essential part of their of business plan.

There is concern that commercialism, at any level,
will be an invitation to alter the existing source of
federal funding because public broadcasters
could instead garner revenue from advertisements. Some also fear that commercialism will
create a disincentive for viewers to sustain a service that may no longer serve its intended purpose. Critics believe that government can better
decide how these stations should maintain their
34
private and public financial support.
Parameters are in place, however, to ensure
that public television stations do not stray far from
their primary educational goals and, consequently, lose private and public funding.3 5 As described above, both Congress and the Commission have placed limits on the remunerative activities of public stations that protect and sustain the
value and importance of public television. Public
broadcasters are aware of and understand the limits placed on them to receive federal funding. I
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, June 4, 2001, at 2; see also SONICblue
Licenses ReplayTV Software and Hardware to Support Rollout of
Dotcast Digital Network, BuSINESS WIRE, Sept. 19, 2001, at 1-3;
see also TIVO Readies New Platform as UltimateTV and WebTV
Sales Struggle, AuDio WEEK, Oct. 1, 2001, at 1-2.
32 Indeed, in comments filed with respect to the Fifth Report and Order, Association of America's Public Television Stations ("AAPTS") and Public Broadcasting Service ("PBS")

stated "that their biggest concern is the ability of noncommercial stations to raise stfficient funds to support current
operations and the transition to DTV." Fifth Report and Order,
supra note 3, at 12,851, para. 102.
3 Kumar I, supra note 6, at 7.
34 See, e.g., Comments of UCC, supra note 25, at 9-14; see
also Kumar I, supra note 6, at 7.
35 See infra § IIA of this article.
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trust that they are able to determine the importance of such funding and ensure that they do not
cross lines that may put that funding in jeopardy.
Moreover, I trust NCE stations to continue to provide a service that is responsive to the tastes and
desires of their audience in order to ensure the
continuity of viewer donations. There is no reason to doubt their desire and ability to maximize
their own interest-which, in the case of public
television, is to produce quality educational programming. 36 If these stations continue to provide
their communities with innovative educational
services, they will continue to have the resources
to better serve the public interest.
Mere speculation that licensees may not act in
their own best interests should not be the basis for
cutting off a potential source of funding for public stations. Furthermore, due to this unsubstantiated fear, such paternalism is inherently inefficient because it deprives the public of the benefits
that can be easily associated with flexibility. Public broadcasters are in the best position to understand their audience, their goals and the limits
that are placed on their ability to raise funds.
Moreover, even if licensees along the way may
take steps that hurt their interests, greater benefits can be derived overall from trusting licensees
to design their own business plans rather than
mandating those plans for them.
In fact, by restricting commercials on spectrum
used for non-broadcast television services or further limiting the amount of commercial services
public stations can offer, government would risk
jeopardizing the viability of digital public television. Without this additional source of funds,
public stations may not be able to provide the
high quality non-commercial services that communities have come to expect from public television. They may not have sufficient funds to produce programs in HDTV or multicast. Both the

quantity and quality of educational services could
decrease and the public would be the ultimate
losers.
Public television has played, and continues to
play, a vital role in American society and it should
be given the opportunity to grow and flourish. A
public station's self-interest is to further the public interest by providing quality educational programming and services. By allowing NCE entities
to use their excess digital video capacity for remunerative services and to include commercials on
their non-broadcast services, the NCE Order will
help strengthen the noncommercial educational
broadcasting system. NCE stations will have the
flexibility to generate funds to support and enhance their digital operations and to be creative
and innovative in how they use their digital television spectrum, while also preserving the
non-commercial educational nature of public
broadcasting. At the same time, existing regulation and oversight sufficiently ensure and protect
the viability of public programming. Furthermore, nothing in the NCE Order requires public
television stations to provide commercial services.
I trust that these stations will exercise or decline
to exercise these rights responsibly and as they see
fit. There is no reason to doubt that public stations will continue to fulfill their public interest
role by offering noncommercial educational programming. The NCE Order simply provides such
non-commercial broadcasters with the opportunity to enrich such programming offerings for the
benefit of the stations, and for the benefit of the
37
American public.

36
As the Commission stated in the NCE Order, "this action will help to preserve the noncommercial educational nature of public broadcasting, while allowing NCE licensees
some flexibility in remunerative use of their spectrum and
indicating the boundaries that we will apply to such use."
NCE Order, supra note 4, at 19,042, para. 17.
37 Indeed, the AAPTS "intends to revise guidelines to ensure that PTV stations use their 'new freedom' responsibly."
AAPTS President John Lawson stated that "public television
stations' ability to use some of their nonbroadcast digital
spectrum to produce revenue would serve as an antidote to
creeping commercialism" because presently analog stations
are under pressure to run "enhanced" underwriting spots on
prime time programming. The guidelines would be

strengthened to further two objectives: "(1) To assure that
stations use their new funding streams to plow back revenue
into developing noncommercial content [; and] (2) To
demonstrate to critics that PTV stations will use their freedom to solicit ads on nonbroadcast digital channels responsibly." Kumar II, supra note 7, at 3.
38 An ITFS licensee is required to be an educational institution or a governmental body engaged in the formal education of enrolled students. In addition, nonprofit organizations formed to provide instructional material to enrolled
students and nonprofit organizations that would be eligible
to be licensees of noncommercial educational broadcast television stations are eligible to become ITFS licensees. See 47
C.F.R. § 74.932(a) (2000). ITFS stations traditionally have

III.

FLEXIBILITY IN THE 2500-2690 MHZ
BAND

The Commission's policy in the Instructional
Television Fixed Service ("ITFS") 38 and Mul-
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tichannel Multipoint Distribution Services
("MMDS") 39 faced a similar fork in the spectrum
policy road between markets and mandates. 40
New mobile service providers, eager to get their
hands on more spectrum for third generation
("3G") mobile services, called for the Commission
to add a mobile allocation to the band and to
relocate the ITFS/MMDS incumbents to pave the
way for a 3G auction. 41 Not surprisingly, the incumbents had a different view. In defense of the
status quo, they cited extensive relocation costs,
the success of the current educational offerings in
the band and the promise of a wireless broadband
pipe. 42 Faced with these difficult choices, I ultimately concluded that the best approach was to
put markets to work for the public interest.
A.

Background

The MMDS/ITFS band (2500-2690 MHz) has
had a long, complex and commercially-troubled
history. Regulation has played a significant role
in this fate-the Commission often was slow in rebeen used to provide formal telecourses to schools, hospitals,
workplaces and other places of learning; transmission of educational programming, including news and public affairs pro-

gramming, into schools; provision of professional training
for teachers, health professionals, public safety officers, and
others; and the transmission of teleconferences for educational, training and administrative purposes. Thus, ITFS has
become an integral part of the curriculum of many educators. See FCC, OET, INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECTRUM STUDY
OF THE

2500-2690 MHz

BAND, THE POTENTIAL FOR ACCOMMO-

MOBILE SYSTEMS, FCC/OET Dkt.
No. 00-232, at 19 (Nov. 2000) [hereinafter Interim Study]; see
also FCC, OET, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECTRUM STUDY OF THE
2500-2690 MHz BAND, TIlE POTENTIAL FOR ACCOMMODATING
THIRD GENERATION MOBILE SYSTEMS, FCC/OET Dkt. No. 00258, at 14 (Mar. 2001) [hereinafter Final Report].
39 In the 2500-2690 MHz band, ITFS channels occupy
the 2500-2596 MHz portion of the band and MMDS channels occupy the 2596-2660 MHz portion. The remaining
DATING THIRD GENERATION

ITFS and MMDS channels are interleaved in the tipper por-

tion of the band above 2660 MHz. In addition, under certain
circumstances, MMDS entities can apply for licenses for up to
eight ITFS channels per community, with ITFS entities having a subsequent right of access to those channels. See 47
C.F.R. §§ 74.990, 74.991, 79.992 (2001); see also In reAmendment of Parts 21, 43, 74, 78, and 94 of the Commission's
Rules Governing Use of the Frequencies in the 2.1 and 2.5
GHz Bands Affecting: Private Operational-Fixed Microwave
Service, Multipoint Distribution Service, Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service, Instructional Television Fixed Service, and Cable Television Relay Service, Second Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 6792, 6801-06 (1991). It is also noted that
licensees the 2150-2162 MHz band work in conjunction with
MMDS and ITFS licensees.
40
See In re Amendment of Part 2 of the Commission's
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sponding to marketplace changes, resulting in
anachronistic limitations on licensees' ability to
serve the public. The band initially was designed,
and predominately has been used, for one-way
analog video transmission. These services had two
"flavors": (1) video services for education and
training in schools, health care centers and other
institutions, and (2) a commercial video distribu43
tion service known as "wireless cable.."
Over time, the Commission provided these
licensees with flexibility to diversify their offerings. In 1983, ITFS licensees were permitted to
lease excess channel capacity to MMDS licensees,
thereby providing additional income to help underwrite the cost of providing ITFS service. 4 4 In
1996, the Commission auctioned MDS Basic Trading Area ("BTA") authorizations in the
2150-2162 MHz and 2500-2690 MHz bands.
That auction yielded $216.2 million for the U.S.
Treasury. 45 Also, in 1996, the Commission first
permitted digital use of this band, allowing ITFS/
MMDS licensees to provide multiple channels of
video programming and high-speed digital appliRules to Allocate Spectrum Below 3 GHz for Mobile and
Fixed Services to Support the Introduction of New Advanced

Wireless Services, including Third Generation Wireless Systems; Amendment of the U.S. Table of Frequency Allocations
to Designate the 2500-2520/2670-2690 MHz Frequency
Bands for the Mobile-Satellite Service, First Report and Order,
and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd. 17,222
(2001) [hereinafter ITPS/MMDS Flexibility Order].
41
Id. at 17,222, para. 2.
42
See id. at 17,222, paras. 3-6 (citing Comments of Sprint
Corporation) ;see also id. at 17,222, paras. 15-17 (citing Comments of the Wireless Communications Association International, Inc.).
43 Id. at 17,225-26, paras. 8, 10.
44
See In re Amendment of Parts 2, 21, 74 and 94 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations in regard to frequency
allocation to the Instructional Television Fixed Service, the
Multipoint Distribution Service, and the Private Operational
Fixed Microwave Service; Inquiry into the development of
regulatory policy with regard to future service offerings and
expected growth in the Multipoint Distribution Service and
Private Operational Fixed Microwave Service, and into the
development of provisions of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations in regard to the compatibility of the operation of
satellite services with other services authorized to operate in
the 2500-2690 MHz band; Amendment of Part 21 of the
Commission's Rules to Permit the Use of Alternative Procedures in Choosing Applicants for Radio Authorizations in the
Multipoint Distribution Service, Report and Order, 94 F.C.C.2d
1203 (1983); see also Interim Study, supra note 38, at 19; see also
47 C.F.R. § 74.931 (2001).
45
See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, AUCTION
6: MUIIPOINT/MULTICHANNEL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES FACT
SrHEET 1-2, at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/06/factsheet.html (last modified Aug. 2, 2001).
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cations. 46
By 1998, it became clear that wireless cable applications were struggling in the marketplace due
47
In an effort
to technical and capital constraints.
the Comband,
in
the
development
to facilitate
mission authorized the use of two-way transmissions on ITFS/MMDS frequencies, thereby enabling the provision of potentially more lucrative
two-way voice and data services. 48 Deployment of
two-way, digital ITFS/MMDS systems nationwide
was designed to give the public another option for
high-speed broadband access and to further competition with providers of Digital Subscriber Line
("DSL") and cable modem services, and, in particular, to speed deployment of broadband services
to rural areas and to educational users. 49 In the
Two-Way Order,the Commission also expanded its
definition of educational usage requirements on
the ITFS band, allowing both voice and data ser50
vices to satisfy the programming requirements.
Thus, ITFS licensees were given the flexibility to
provide educational users with broadband access
for both video and data applications, becoming
an integral tool for educational systems. 5' An initial filing window for two-way service was opened
in August 2000. Following this initial filing window, on April 16, 2001, the Commission commenced a rolling one-day filing window process,
which permitted licensees to apply for authorizations on a first-come first-served basis. 52 Approximately 1,600 of those applications were granted
53
by the Commission by January 2002.
While the MMDS/ITFS band was slowly evolvSee In re Request for Declaratory Ruling on the Use of
Digital Modulation by Multipoint Distribution Service and Instructional Television Fixed Service Stations, Declaratory Ruling and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 18,839 (1996); see also The Mass
46

Media Bureau Implements Policy for Provision of Internet
Service on MDS and Leased ITFS Frequencies, Public Notice,
11 FCC Rcd. 22,419 (1996); see also Interim Study, supra note
38, at 19-20; see also Final Report, supra note 38, at 14.
47

See In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competi-

tion in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming,
Fourth Annual Report, 13 FCC Rcd. 1034 (1998) (noting that
the MMDS industry's negative cash flow increased from $3.9
million in 1995 to $40.5 million in 1996).
48
See In reAmendment of Parts 21 and 74 to Enable Mul-

tipoint Distribution Service and Instructional Television
Fixed Service Licensees to Engage in Fixed Two-Way Transmissions, Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 19,112 (1998), recon.,
14 FCC Rcd. 12,764 (1999),furtherrecon., 15 FCC Rcd. 14,566
(2000) [hereinafter Two-Way Order]; see also ITFS/MMDS Flexibility Order, supra note 40, at 17,222, paras. 8, 13.
49 See ITFS/MMDS Flexibility Order, supra note 40, at
17,222, para. 19; see also Interim Study, supra note 38, at 17-18;
see also Final Report, supra note 38, at 13.

ing through various regulatory incarnations, the
nation's wireless carriers were in a frantic search
for 3G spectrum to meet their expanding capacity
and technological needs. At the 2000 World Radio Conference ("WRC") in Istanbul, the Conference determined that nations would study a variety of bands with the intention of globally harmonized 3G spectrum plans. One of the identified
segments was the ITFS/MMDS band at
2500-2690 MHz. 54 Partially in response to the

WRC, the Commission initiated a study by its Office of Engineering and Technology to assess the
Commission's options regarding the band. That
Office concluded that sharing would be extremely
55
difficult and could cost between $10-30 billion.
This report also found that sharing between existing fixed and new mobile licensees was not a
promising alternative. Nonetheless, many mobile
wireless carriers believed this band was a. strong
candidate for 3G, particularly because of the perceived reluctance of government incumbents to
vacate some of the other bands identified by the
WRC. 56

Granting Existing Licensees Additional
Flexibility in How to Offer Their Services is
the Clearest Path to Additional Public
Benefits.

B.

In assessing these competing interests, I was extremely wary of the idea that government is always
in the best position to mandate solutions to spectrum management problems. Here, the CommisSee Two-Way Order, supra note 48, at 19,159-60, paras.
50
89-90; see also Interim Study, supra note 38, at 20.
51
See Interim Study, supra note 38, at 20.
See Mass Media Bureau Provides Further Information
52
Regarding Grants of ITFS and MDS Two-Way Applications;
Certain ITFS Major Modification Applications; and The Rolling One-Day Filing Window Procedure, PublicNotice, 16 FCC
Rcd. 7,066 (2001) [hereinafter Public Notice].
See In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Ad53
vanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a
Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps To Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report, CC Dkt. No. 98-

146, FCC 02-33, para. 146 (rel. Feb. 6, 2002).
54 See generally Final Acts of the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC - 2000) (Istanbul, June 2, 2000)
[hereinafter Final Acts].
55
56

See Final Report, supra note 38, at iii.
See id. at xv; see also id. at 15-17 (citing the Comments

made by Ericsson). Indeed, these debates continue to this
day, as the federal government continues to explore whether
any additional spectrum can be freed up for third generation

commercial services.
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sion was presented with two decision points: (1)
whether the government should order incumbent
MMDS/ITFS licensees to vacate all or part of the
band, and (2) regardless of the answer to number
one, whether the Commission should allow
mobile operations in the band.
1.

In assessing the utility of government-forced
relocation, I looked to the Commission's prior experience with this policy approach. As a veteran
of the PCS and cellular industry rollouts, I understood that there are times when government is left
with little choice but to relocate incumbents to
7

broadband pipe to the home. Thus, I was skeptical of the idea of a government mandate to force
relocation, distribute relocation costs and find a
new home for MMDS. In particular, it seemed paternalistic and potentially misguided to conclude
that the possible fixed wireless broadband services
to be offered by the incumbents were not worth
pursuing.

Government-Forced Relocation

pave the way for new services. 5
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However, I also

understood government-forced relocation to be a
drastic solution, with significant delay and substantial transaction costs. In the PCS context, the
Commission was certain, as was I, that the value of
multiple mobile providers to the American people outweighed the interest of the incumbent
fixed microwave licensees' continued operations
in the band. Moreover, there appeared to be
readily available relocation bands for the fixed microwave licensees that had occupied the PCS
bands. Finally, the costs of relocation appeared to
be dwarfed by the potential "upside" applications
in the band.
In contrast, these benefits seemed far less clear
in the MMDS/ITFS band. The incumbent licensees in these bands provided extremely important
educational services throughout the country-in
urban centers as well as rural and underserved
areas. The MMDS licensees, while only recently
granted the flexibility to do so, were in the process of developing and launching a wireless broadband service to the home. A wireless broadband
offering is a keystone to spurring broadband competition through offerings from multiple facilities-based platforms. If wireless broadband was
not to come from MMDS, it was not clear which
spectrum band would provide such an opportunity or when. Thus, relocation would be a serious
blow to our policy goal of establishing another
57 See In re Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New Telecommunications Technologies, First Report and Order, and Third Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 6886 (1992); see generally BENNE-1r Z.
KOBB, WIRELESS SPECTRUM FINDER 260 (2001). 1 served as
Regulatory Counsel to AirTouch Communications-a wireless carrier-from 1993 until1998 and experienced these pol-

On the other side of the ledger, I have been a
strong advocate of additional spectrum for 3G
mobile services. However, I also understood that
on the mobile carriers' "wish list," the lower bands
identified at WRC (for example, 1710-1770) were
58
far more coveted than the MMDS/ITFS bands.
Indeed, it appeared that most of the globe would
be using the lower bands, eliminating many of the
alleged global economies of scale if the Commission were to redesignate the 2500-2690 MHz
band.
When faced with the current and future educational operations and the potential for a wireless
broadband offering balanced against a possible
3G deployment, I thought the public interest
would be better served by the current incumbent
operations. The OET report contained extraordinary relocation cost estimates in the tens of billions of dollars. 59 That report also concluded that
sharing between incumbent fixed users and new
third party mobile service providers was not realistic. 60 In addition, the time and detailed regulatory intervention that would be required to carry
out relocation further convinced me that the incumbents' current operations better served the
public interest. Even with all these factors, I
might have contemplated relocation, but the
Commission had been unable to identify any truly
viable bands to which these licensees could be
moved.
2. An Added Mobile Allocation.
Once the decision had been made to permit
the incumbent operators to remain in the band,
the Commission faced a second question: Should
the band allocation be changed to allow for
icies coming to fruition, including the auction of PCS spectrun.
51
See, e.g., Final Report, supra note 38, at 16-17 (citing the
Comments made by AT&T Wireless).
59
See Final Report, supra note 38, at 88-92.
60 See id. at 27-36.
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mobile applications? Section 3 0 3 (y) of the Communications Act grants the Commission authority
to allocate spectrum to provide for flexible use if:
(1) such use is consistent with international agreements to which the United States is a party; and
(2) the Commission finds, after notice and an opportunity for public comment, that (A) such an
allocation would be in the public interest; (B)
such use would not deter investment in communications services and systems or technology development; and (C) such use would not result in
harmful interference among users. 6 1 With these
answers in hand, how could regulatory policy best
balance these interests while providing maximum
benefits to the public interest?
As for the first prong of the test, a mobile allocation is consistent with international agreements
to which the United States is a party. 62 The second prong presents more difficult issues: What is
the public interest here? Would the allocation deter investment? What would the interference consequences be of a mobile allocation?
3. Interference
Addressing these issues in reverse order, the addition of a mobile allocation alone would not alter in any way the existing interference protection
afforded to the incumbent licensees. Since there
are no current significant interference issues in
the bands, the change in allocation would not result in harmful interference among users. In
many ways, however, I see this statutory mandate
as a guidepost in eventually fashioning the appropriate service rules for the band. That is, can
mobile rules be crafted that allow for meaningful
mobile use while protecting incumbent operations?
Interference protection lies at the core of the
Commission's responsibilities to protect licensees
by preventing the externalization of costs through
interference. As discussed above, the Commission
had already determined that sharing between
third-party 3G mobile services and the incumbent MMDS/ITFS licensees was not possible without substantial costs to all parties. In my view,
47 U.S.C. § 303(f) (2000).
The 2500-2690 MHz band is allocated in Region 2
(which includes the U.S.) on a primary basis to the Fixed,
Fixed Satellite, Mobile except Aeronautical Mobile, and
Broadcasting-Satellite Services. See 47 C.F.R. § 2.106 (2001);
61

62

however, the allocation issue is slightly different:
Could the Commission, as a responsible interference cop, add to the bundle of rights enjoyed by
current licensees? Although the OET report
showed challenges associated with shared fixed
and mobile use, that examination focused on the
possibility of introducing a third party mobile provider through a 3G auction. Here the question
was whether the current licensees could cooperatively put a mobile allocation to responsible use.
In this regard, I found it significant that licensee
cooperation was the driving philosophy behind
the rules and interference methodology in the
Two-Way proceeding. The Commission stated in
the Two-Way Order
This symbiotic relationship [between licensees]
has resulted in a history of cooperation that has
allowed MDS and ITFS entities to reach their mutual goals. It also creates an environment that is
appropriate for the deregulatory approach we
adopt here, which is itself premised on cooperation between all the parties involved rather than
on the Commission acting as an arbiter of every
possible dispute that may arise, especially in re63
gard to interference resolution,
This demonstrated ability to work together
made me even more comfortable with my fundamental trust in the ability of existing licensees to
realize and act in their own self-interests to create
a set of interference rules that permit a variety of
uses to survive and thrive. In contrast, the more
paternalistic government view would be that we
cannot trust the licensees to act in their own enlightened self-interests, instead government must
limit those rights. In the end, I believe that current licensees should be permitted to, and can
work among themselves with the Commission, to
craft service rules that allow interference-free operations.
4. Investment Impact.
As for flexibility's impact on technological development of ITFS and MMDS, I believe that mobile allocation may provide the impetus for new
and innovative services in these bands. This allosee also Final Acts, supra note 54 (designating the 2500-2690
MHz band for possible IMT-2000 use).
63

Two-Way Order, supra note 48, at 19,114, para. 4 (em-

phasis added).
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cation harmonizes the U.S. Table with the rest of
our region and eliminates any regulatory uncertainty as to whether portable uses are allowed in
the band. Regionally harmonized allocations
lend themselves to the type of scale and scope
that leads to research and product development.
Moreover, in light of our conclusions about the
need to protect incumbent users, our decision
could well spur development of integrated service
offerings that allow mobile and fixed services to
share more readily. Some companies have already begun experimentation with portable uses
in the band, such as IPWireless, Inc.'s operations
in North Carolina. 64 However, questions have
been raised about whether that use would violate
the existing fixed allocation. The mobile allocation eliminates that uncertainty and allows
IPWireless and other companies to attract additional investment and move forward. Some have
argued that the mobile allocation would actually
deter investment, thereby violating the statutory
mandate of Section 3 03 (y). They contend that by
adding a mobile allocation, the Commission
would deter investment in the existing fixed services in the band. This is a bit like saying government should prohibit the sale of popcorn as a way
to encourage investment in corn flakes. That is,
we have a resource (spectrum or corn) that can
be used for multiple applications (fixed or
mobile, corn flakes or popcorn, respectively).
Obviously, if government prohibits the use of one
(mobile, or popcorn) it may shift some resources
to the remaining available uses (fixed, or corn
flakes). But in the end, the ban on one market
(mobile, or popcorn) does not create more demand or more of a business plan for the other
(fixed, or corn flakes). So, if you are not making
money on your fixed allocation, the bar on
mobile uses will not make fixed more appealing.
The inverse also seems true: If your fixed business
is more lucrative, the addition of the mobile allocation will not change your business plan. Moreover, even if an individual licensee (like MMDS) is

prevented from choosing a mobile business over a
fixed one, the capital markets have no such constraints. Therefore, if fixed makes no sense economically, capital will flow to higher yielding mobile wireless ventures or other investments elsewhere regardless of the addition of mobile allocation in the band. In the end, it is difficult to contend that more flexibility within a band would
lessen the investment in a particular fixed applica-

64
IPWireless, Inc. has developed a technology that will
allow its customers to utilize modems inside buildings under
non-line-of-sight conditions. See 177S/MMDS Flexibility Order,
supra note 40, at 17,222, para. 16; see generally IPWireless, Inc.,
at http://www.ipwireless.com/techover.html (last visited
Sept. 27, 2002).
65 However, there are cases where full flexibility is not
warranted under the statute. See, e.g., In re Amendment of
Part 2 of the Commission's Rules to Allocate Spectrum Below
3 GHz for Mobile and Fixed Services to Support the Intro-

duction of New Advanced Wireless Services, including Third
Generation Wireless Systems; Amendment of the U.S. Table
of Frequency Allocations to Designate the 2500-2520/
2670-2690 MHz Frequency Bands for the Mobile-Satellite
Service, First Report and Order, and Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 16 FCC Rcd. 17,222, para. 24 (2001).
See generally LYNNE PEPALL, DANIEL J. RICt4ARDS &
66

tion.

5.

65

Public Interest Assessment.

Finally, in assessing the public interest, I return
to my initial presumption that the market can determine what services are more valued and can respond to such changes in demand far more precisely and more efficiently than government. In
this regard, it is important to recognize that the
flexibility afforded by a mobile allocation does not
require any incumbent licensee to do anything.
Rather, it may be that the existing fixed uses continue to dominate the band if they prove to be the
highest valued use. To question the assessment
essentially amounts to questioning the ability of
the American people to assess their own interests.
That is, markets are a direct reflection of the cumulative values that individual consumers place
on various services.6f

Government should not

presume that is it is better able to assess the values
consumers place on various types of communications services and instead should permit public resources, like spectrum, to be used for these purposes. Where, as here, the self-interest of the
licensees seems generally to track the public interest, I believe government is best advised to stand
back and allow the marketplace to work.
Existing MMDS/ITFS licensees provide valuable services to the marketplace and the ITFS/
MMDS Flexibility Order does not undermine the
value of their services. Rather, additional flexibility allows such licensees to improve their services
by keeping pace with market and technological

GEORGE NORMAN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: CONTEMPORARY
THEORY AND PRACTICE

(1999).
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changes. In the end, the only goal is to provide
licensees with the opportunity to enhance their
value through mobile use if the licensees wish to
67
initiate such a service.
With respect to the educational purposes of
ITFS licensees, the added flexibility may provide
new ways for them to achieve their educational
missions. When that self-interest (in maximizing
the value of the band) coincides with the public
interest (in maximizing service offerings), I believe government acts best when it acts least. Government should trust in the incentives provided
by that self-interest and the creativity of the marketplace to design strategies and innovations to
achieve the shared goal, rather than crafting paternalistic rules that circumscribe precise steps to
achieve the goal based on government's knowledge and conception of the "correct" path.
Some have argued that adding flexibility undermines the public interest because it represents an
unfair windfall to incumbent MMDS/ITFS licensees who value their spectrum based on its permitted uses. Opponents argue that this is particularly
problematic because other licensees have paid a
substantial sum for their spectrum and now
68
mobile operators highly value MMDS spectrum.
This is a difficult problem. The Commission is
constantly put in the position of having to balance
the equities in granting rights, limiting rights, auctioning spectrum and responding to technological change. There are abundant examples of disparities in our approach to spectrum management over the years. For example, the original
two cellular telephone licensees in each region received their licenses for free. 69 In the inverse of
the MMDS problem, cellular and PCS licensees
were granted the right to provide fixed operations
in their bands, but were not charged for those ad-

ditional rights or subject to supplemental auctions. 70 International satellite systems are barred
by statute from auctions, yet their services may
soon be substitutable for auction-eligible terrestrial services. 71 And, indeed, these international
satellite companies have requested the flexibility
72
to provide terrestrial services in these bands.
Obviously, the initial method of licensing a service must be determined based on the initial service rules. 73 Therefore, spectrum designated for
international satellite or public safety services cannot be subject to auction. To the extent that over
time technology or other factors alter the value of
the rights we add or subtract, I believe that the
Commission should be reluctant to intervene in
an effort to craft perfect symmetry in licensing.
Having established that sharing is not possible
with a new overlaid mobile entrant, MMDS/ITFS
licensees are the only parties capable of utilizing
the mobile allocation. To deny MMDS/ITFS
mobile rights based on a "windfall" would grind
regulatory action to a halt. It would also ensure
that the public would never benefit from possible
mobile uses in the band. Short-changing the
public interest in this way seems unnecessarily restrictive. This is especially true when the evolving
nature of the Commission's statutory authority
has ensured disparate treatment already. For instance, cellular service was authorized before the
Commission had auction authority, international
satellite is barred from auction and mutually exclusive terrestrial applications must be auctioned.
The best a regulator can do is to attempt to maximize the cumulative public interest in fully utilizing the national spectrum resource.
MMDS/ITFS licensees and the public are now
well positioned to enjoy the fruits of a decade of
technological advances and the Commission's

67
See ITFS/MMDS Flexibility Order, supra note 40, at 31
(citing Separate Statement of Commissioner Kathleen Abernathy).
68
See, e.g., id. at 8-10 (citing Comments made by Verizon
Wireless) ; see also id. at 13-14 (citing Comments made by
Motorola, Inc.); see also id. at 4 (citing Comments made by
Cingular Wireless LLC).
69 See In re An Inquiry Into the Use of the Bands 825-845
MHz and 870-890 MHz for Cellular Communications Systems; and Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the Commission's
Rules Relative to Cellular Communications Systems, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 89 F.C.C.2d. 58
(1982).
70
See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules To
Permit Flexible Service Offerings in the Commercial Mobile
Radio Services, First Report and Order, and FurtherNotice of Pro-

posed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 8965, 8971, para. 11 (1996).
71
See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (5), (14) (2000).
72
See Ex parte Presentations and Post-Reply Comment
Period Filings In Permit-But-Disclose Proceedings, Public Notice, 2001 FCC LEXIS 1453 (rel. Mar. 13, 2001); see also International Bureau Sets Deadlines Concerning Motient/TMI
Assignment and Transfer of Control Applications, and Motient's Request for Second Generation Satellite/Terrestrial
Base Station System; Deadline Extended for TMI's Applications to Assign Earth Stations, Public Notice, 2001 FCC LEXIS
1544 (rel. Mar. 19, 2001).
73 See, e.g., In re Implementation of Section 309(j) and
337 of the Communications Act of 1934 as Amended, Memorandum Opinion and Order, WT Dkt. No. 99-87, FCC 02-82, paras. 19-43 (rel. Apr. 18, 2002).
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regulatory labor. We have removed technological
restrictions, increased commercial flexibility,
made more spectrum available and encouraged
technological innovation. The ITFS/MMDS Flexibility Order takes another step towards providing
licensees with one more choice on how to further
develop and deploy services that meet theirs and
the public's needs. As the communications world
moves from static analog one-way services to a dynamic digital two-way mobile environment, the
ITFS and MMDS licensees in this band will now
have the tools for another cycle of innovation, investment and creative new services to better meet
the needs of their users. I look forward to the
public's opportunity to fully enjoy the benefits of
these licensees' entrepreneurship, dedication to
74 See ITIS/MMDS Flexibility Order, supra note 40, at 33
(citing Separate Statement of Commissioner Kathleen

Abernathy).
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community and innovation in the marketplace.7
V.

4

CONCLUSION

The two decisions discussed above continue a
line of Commission and congressional decisions
to allow educational licensees more flexibility to
provide services that are true to their missions.
There can be a significant price placed on consumer welfare when the government-albeit with
good intentions-tries to over-regulate licensees
whose self-interests coincide with the public interest. In these cases, our licensees know how to
achieve their educational goals and serve the public interest better than the government. We certainly should give them the opportunity to do so.

